Work Representation and Union Representativeness on the Frontier of Wage Earning: by Yon, Karel
 
Travail et Emploi 
Hors-série | 2013
2013 Special Edition
Work Representation and Union
Representativeness on the Frontier of Wage
Earning:
The Case of Direct Distribution of Printed Matter
Représentation du travail et représentativité syndicale aux marges du salariat :







DARES - Ministère du Travail
Printed version
Date of publication: 15 December 2013




Karel Yon, « Work Representation and Union Representativeness on the Frontier of Wage Earning: », 
Travail et Emploi [Online], Hors-série | 2013, Online since 01 January 2014, connection on 03 May 2019.
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/travailemploi/6301  ; DOI : 10.4000/travailemploi.6301 
© La documentation française
Travail et Emploi, 2013 Special Edition • 83 •
Work Representation and Union 
Representativeness on the Frontier of Wage 
Earning: the Case of Direct Distribution  
of Printed Matter (*)
Karel Yon (**)
Is the reform of union representativeness a solution to the problem of union institutionalization? 
The article addresses this question, which has been raised by those who participated in the 
reform as well as by labour specialists. Through the study of the newly built branch [branche 
professionnelle, an industry-wide collective bargaining unit] of the direct distribution of printed 
material, it is shown that the reform cannot solve a problem which is incorrectly formulated. 
Union institutionalization is, indeed, a contradictory process, which separates workers and their 
representatives just as much as it links them together. This precision leads us to study the impact 
of the reform of union representativeness in a more nuanced way. The mobilization of the rules 
of representativeness in the two irms under study shows that the reform has ambivalent effects 
in terms of unionization. The new regime of representativeness does not guarantee any tighter 
control by workers over their representatives. However, it reinforces the interdependence between 
the respective arenas of the professional branch and the irm which are now connected through 
the electoral process.
It is a commonplace idea that the unions are 
too institutionalized which can lead to their acting 
in isolation, to negotiating on behalf of everyone 
without being accountable to anyone. In response 
to this problem, the law of 20 August 2008 “On 
the improvement of industrial democracy and the 
reform of working time” was adopted (See Box 
1). Shortly before signing a joint position which 
would essentially be taken up in the law, Francois 
Chérèque, the general secretary of the French 
Democratic Confederation of Labour (CFDT), 
interpreted this negotiation as a means of bring‑
ing the unions and employees closer together: 
“The trade unionist is present in the company, the 
employee knows him. The unions are seen as insti‑
tutions belonging to the decision‑making elite. I 
also believe that unions are too institutionalized. 
This is why the trade unions’ representative‑
ness in the workplace should be deined.” (1) At 
the same time, a similar argument was made by 
the General Confederation of Labour (CGT), 
which criticized the 1966 decree as presenting the 
unions “as immutable institutions, separate from 
(*) Article published in French in Travail et emploi, nº 131, 
juillet‑septembre 2012.
(**) Ceraps (UMR 8026) –Université de Lille 2 ; karel.yon@
univ‑lille2.fr
(1) “Le dialogue social sera toujours un combat,” interview 
with François Chérèque, Challenges, n° 117, 27 March 2008, 
pp. 66‑68.
the expression of the employees they represent,” 
and called for representativeness which lowed 
“from the vote of employees in personnel elec‑
tions [at] all levels (irm, professional sector, 
labour market area, region, nation).” (2) By repeal‑
ing the irrefutable presumption of representativity 
of the ive “historic” confederations in favour of an 
electoral‑based procedure, the 2008 reform aimed 
at establishing “strong and legitimate” unions. (3) 
Not only might it encourage the unions to take the 
employees’ vote into account in their negotiations, 
in particular by prohibiting minority agreements, 
it might even play a role in encouraging unioniza‑
tion, forcing unions to have a suficiently strong 
and widespread activist base so as to meet elec‑
toral tests.
(2) “Négociation sur la réforme de la représentativité. État des 
lieux et propositions de la CGT. Fiche 3. Une représentativité 
des organisations syndicales administrée,” accessed 28 April 
2008 on the CGT web site : http://www‑v2.cgt.fr/internet/html/
lire/?id_doc=5836
(3) Legislative record on the law n° 2008‑789 of 20 August 
2008 on renewal of industrial democracy and reform of 
working time –Explanatory Memorandum. Légifrance website, 
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Box 1
The Rules of Union Representativeness and their Reform in 2008 
It is crucial for labor unions to hold a representative status for it gives access to numerous rights (namely the 
right to designate union representatives and thus give legal protection to activists in the workplace, the right to 
collective bargaining, and the right to receive various state inancing). 
Before 2008, there were two different means by which trade unions could be considered representative:
1) The most convenient was state recognition. Since 1966, ive confederations had beneited from that privilege 
known as the “irrefutable presumption of representativity” (présomption irréfragable de représentativité), which 
made them representative at all levels of action: CGT, CFDT, FO, CFTC, CFE-CGC.
2) Other unions had to demand recognition in the courts, and establish proof before a judge of their represen-
tative status. Each process of recognition was limited to a speciic bargaining area, from a single workplace to a 
national irm or a whole industry. So it was very dificult and costly for newborn unions to develop.
The procedure decided on in the 2008 act is now based on workplace elections.
The irst hurdle to overcome is to be recognized as a trade union, in order to get the right to run for elections. 
But the law made this quite easy. Hence each of the ive above-mentioned unions, as well as additional organiza-
tions, are now placed in fair competition with each other and can designate transitory union representatives (RSS, 
représentants de section syndicale) in all the irms in which they are not yet representative.
The second step is crucial, for it decides recognition as a representative union. All unions that reach a thres-
hold of 10% of the recorded votes are now considered representative. The recognition is effective at the level of the 
electoral process, which is the irm or a speciic unit within it. Indeed, there can be several works councils within a 
single irm, in relation to several workplace locations.
In addition, a union member now has to be a candidate in workplace elections and reach the threshold of 10% 
of the votes on his personal name in order to be designated as union representative.
Beyond the irm, there are two additional levels of recognition: the industry level and the national, cross-
industry level. Both are calculated by aggregating the results in all irms. The threshold is 8% of the recorded 
votes at the industry level. At the national level, unions also need to be representative in branches from a variety of 
sectors including industry, construction, trade and services.
Another important aspect of the reform is that the rules now forbid minority agreements. Any collective agree-
ment has to be signed by unions representing at least 30% of the recorded votes, as a condition for it to be imple-
mented. In addition, unions representing at least 50% of the recorded votes can oppose a collective agreement.
Two additional bills were passed in 2010. The irst one concerned the representative status of unions among 
civil servants which is now based on a similar electoral process. The second one concerned very small irms (less 
than 10 employees). Workers in those irms do not have elected representatives. To ensure that all workers are 
called on to take part in deining which unions are representative, they now have to vote every four years, not to 
elect individuals but to choose the union by which they agree to be represented.
NB: box added to the English translation.
The reform of union representation was defended 
by its proponents as the irst step in a solution to 
the crisis of union representation in relation to 
union weaknesses within important sectors of the 
wage earners, whether in the TPE (very small busi‑
nesses) and PMEs (small and medium enterprises), 
or in the service sector, among youth and precari‑
ous workers. Up to now, organizations’ proactive 
efforts alone (4) have not been able to check this 
crisis. Testing this assertion would require investi‑
gating multiple ields corresponding to the different 
possible ields of unionization. This article aims at 
providing an initial contribution to this work of 
(4) Structural reorganization, targeted objectives in increas‑
ing membership, targeting the underrepresented sections of the 
wage earners, renewal and diversity of trade union leaders, etc. 
These questions were formulated by the CFDT from the mid‑
1980s (Guillaume, Pochic, 2009) and by the CGT in the early 
2000s (Piotet, 2009).
documentation from one industrial sector. Mailbox 
distribution of unaddressed printed material (lyers, 
free advertising, and institutional publications), 
which industry players call “direct distribution of 
printed matter [distribution directe],” is an interest‑
ing case for several reasons. It is a symbolic ield 
in the “new frontier” of unionization. The emer‑
gence of this sector is illustrative of the growth of 
commercial services in our economy where unions 
are less well established than in industry or the 
public sector. The very recent establishment of the 
sector illustrates the reconstruction of the bounda‑
ries between public and private sectors. Part‑time 
work, an atypical status which undermines job 
security, is the dominant form of employment in 
the sector (see Box 2).
Travail et Emploi, 2013 Special Edition • 85 •
WORK REPRESENTATION AND UNION REPRESENTATIVENESS
Box 2
Direct Distribution of Printed matter: Institutionalized Job Insecurity?
The activity of the distribution of unaddressed printed matter developed in the 1970s along with the rise of free 
advertising media and large scale supermarket distribution, although its origins are even older. With the decline in 
advertising media, as illustrated by the recent liquidation of Paru/Vendu, and the development of internet-based 
advertising sites such as Le Bon coin, distribution irms have entered the ield of virtual communication while the 
work of distributors has refocused on the dissemination of advertising brochures, of institutional publications 
issued by local authorities, and more recently of the new free information press (such as Metro or 20 Minutes).
Although activity is extremely fragmented, it is now mainly dominated by Gratuit, a subsidiary of La Poste, 
and Distrib, a subsidiary of a major media group, which together share 95% of the market. The two companies 
are roughly the same size. The former has a smaller workforce but has higher sales (430 million euros, compared 
to 312.9 million euros for Distrib). According to the Association for Financing the Performing Arts (AFDAS), which 
collects the job training taxes of the direct distribution of printed matter branch, in 2010 there were some 43 distri-
bution irms contributing to this approved professional collector organization. Most are micro-companies that are 
often beyond the rules of the industry. Some irms with more than 50 employees have a regional activity, sometimes 
subcontracting orders from one or another of the “big” irms.
Low wages and dificult working conditions regularly give rise to articles of “moral denunciation” in the local or 
national press. Data presented in the social balance sheet of the branch gives an idea of the conditions for distri-
butors. This data covers the two largest irms, Gratuit and Distrib, which are the only members of the Professional 
Union of Direct Distribution of Printed Matter. In 2011, there were 32,985 distributors, 40% of whom were women, 
and 3,269 supervisory “staff” personnel. The total size of the branch, according to AFDAS, is 22,500 equivalent 
full-time employees, which emphasizes the importance of part-time work. The work force is rather old: half of 
distributors are over 50 years old and only one-eighth of them are under 30. Almost all distributors are on perma-
nent work contracts (CDI [contrat à durée indéterminée]), even though a quarter of those who are newly hired are 
on limited duration work contracts (CDD [contrat à durée déterminée]. There is a high turnover rate, with almost 
as many leaving as those hired (32,750 as compared to 33,279). A quarter of all departures are by resignations and 
almost half are at the end of the trial period, which relects the dificulty irms have in stabilizing the labour force. 
Only 5% of distributors are employed full-time, two-thirds are employed on part-time contracts of less than 65 
hours per month, often below the minimum level for entitlement to social security beneits (60 hours per month). 
The average salary reported in 2011 was 628 € for women and 655 € for men. To the extent that distribution is 
primarily a labour intensive industry, highly dependent on “key account” customers such as the supermarkets, 
distributors’ remuneration remains the main economic adjustment variable. In practice, distributors often work for 
periods exceeding the number of hours for which they are paid, which is regularly conirmed by the convictions 
for “clandestine work”.
The lexible work hours also make direct distribution of printed matter a popular activity with young people, 
women with family responsibilities, as well as workers who need to combine several salaries. The lack of skills 
required and the ease of hiring also attract many immigrant workers, retirees seeking extra income (military 
and retired policemen, impoverished pensioners) or individuals who have had biographical accidents (bankrupt 
shopkeepers, socially marginalised employees). There is no real collective work: the distributors are spread over 
several hundred sites which are all over the map and where they are rarely present. They come every week to get 
their batch of printed matter to distribute and do their rounds alone.
NB: The company names have been changed, although the almost duopolistic structure of the branch makes this operation artiicial.
Direct distribution of printed matter therefore 
combines a set of features which are challenges 
for a “union renewal.” (5) Far from the experi‑
ments conducted in France or abroad in organizing 
precarious workers (Béroud, Bouffartigue, 2009), 
union intervention in this sector has in particular 
advanced a traditional register of action, that of 
collective bargaining. The establishment of this 
branch [branche professionnelle, an industry‑wide 
collective bargaining unit] is the result of a National 
Collective Agreement (CCN, Convention collec-
tive nationale) recently adopted in the mid‑2000s, 
after a decade of negotiations. Union recognition 
was immediately applied at the institutional level 
(5) For a summary in French of this literature, see Thomas, 2011.
through collective bargaining rather than through 
collective action, but this does not seem to have put 
an end to either the precariousness of the sector or 
to its social conlicts which remain endemic. We 
thus ind a situation similar to that described by 
Jean‑Michel Denis (2008) in the industrial cleaning 
sector: precarious workers spread across multiple 
sites, thus preventing unions “from having a terri‑
torial density” suficient to enforce contractual 
work site standards (p. 48). He also discussed the 
“classic problem of ‘distance’ or the space between 
unions and employees, generated by the mecha‑
nism of representation, the bureaucratization of 
organizations, and/or the institutionalization of 
trade unionism” (p. 45). Would direct distribution 
of printed matter become a similar example of this 
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disconnection between the workers and their repre‑
sentatives? In this case, would the law of 20 August 
2008 “On the improvement of industrial democracy 
and the reform of working time” help alleviate this 
problem? Without claiming any possible generaliza‑
tion of its empirical indings, this text nevertheless 
aims at providing food for thought going beyond the 
framework of monographs by shedding new light 
on the question of the institutionalization of unions.
In most discussion on trade unionism –whether by 
researchers, journalists, political and administrative 
actors or by trade unionists themselves– institution‑
alization is seen in a negative sense: it refers to the 
process of growing independence, isolation and 
bureaucratization of organizations which could at 
least partially explain the crisis of the labour move‑
ment. (6) For many years Dominique Andolfatto 
and Dominique Labbé have insisted on the “weak 
social roots of unionism.” Pointing to an “increas‑
ingly questionable representativity,” they portray 
unionists as “professionals of representation […] 
who no longer have any links, other than electoral 
ones, with the employees they are supposed to 
represent and have only a more or less theoretical 
knowledge of the real situation and needs of these 
employees” (Andolfatto, Labbé, 2006, p. 349, 
p. 351). This analysis perpetuates an old problem: 
the critique of the institutionalization of unions, born 
at the dawn of the labour movement with the “iron 
law of oligarchy” (Michels, 1971), which experi‑
enced a signiicant renewal in interest in France in 
the 1980s, during an unlikely conjunction of the 
collapse of union membership and the increase in 
the institutional power of unions (Adam, 1983). It 
was speciically formulated by Pierre Rosanvallon, 
who explained the institutionalization of trade 
unionism by the establishment of its function as a 
“social agency”, i. e., “all union functions which 
are related to an institutional role […]. As a social 
agency, the union is a kind of ‘public ofice of social 
affairs’, a quasi‑public agency. This aspect differs 
from its dimension as a social movement, a force 
which demands and negotiates” (Rosanvallon, 
1998, p. 24). (7) Both the justiications as well as the 
criticisms of the reform of trade union representa‑
tion are generally based on this diagnosis. For some 
it is a way of adjusting union representation to the 
world of real work by reconnecting employees and 
their representatives through the ballot box (Bévort, 
Jobert, 2008). Others have predicted that it would 
(6) This point of view is quite far from the conceptualiza‑
tions developed around the dynamic and pluralistic ield of the 
sociologies of institutionalization (Lagroye, Offerlé, 2010; 
Tournay, 2011).
(7) A similar analysis can be found in Chris Howell’s theory 
of “virtual unionism” (1998, 2009) according to which “trade 
unions in France can be seen, in almost a feudal sense, as an 
estate in which the unions represent an interest –that of labor– 
by virtue of state sponsorship and public conidence rather than 
deep roots within the working class” (Howell, 1998, p. 209). 
[NB: footnote added to the English translation.]
have the opposite of this intended effect: the inten‑
siication of the institutionalization of unions and 
thereby the loss of their social roots (Andolfatto, 
Labbé, 2009). These opposing viewpoints share the 
view that there is a gap between the world of “real” 
work and its union representation. It is this assump‑
tion that I intend discussing in this article.
In my view, institutionalization should not only be 
thought of as a process of differentiation, separating 
union representation from its social “base.” I intend 
demonstrating that this dynamic must be described in 
its contradictory nature, as a movement that also has 
the effect of binding the unions closer to the workers. 
This approach is underpinned by a “constructiv‑
ist” approach to wage labour. As opposed to the 
hypothesis of the disjunction between the world of 
“real” work and union representation, it presents 
both of them as being involved in the institutions of 
wage labour (Vatin, Bernard, 2007; Friot, 2012). 
Institutions, as “mechanisms of knowledge and 
action,” organize economic activities (Salais, 2008), 
just as much as they shape the “workers” in their 
social being and subjectivity (Castel, 1995). Unions 
are doubly involved in this structuring, as estab‑
lished form and establishing force: if “labour law has 
largely been built by building unions” (Borenfreund, 
Souriac, 2008, p. 2), this is because unions, in turn, 
were built by building labour law. In this perspective, 
the institutionalization of unions should be under‑
stood in a wider context, that of the growing legal 
formalization of labour relations with negotiations 
by branch being a key vector of this legal network 
(Didry, 2002). Such an analytical framework, based 
on a detailed ield survey (see Box 3), means break‑
ing with a mechanistic and homogenizing conception 
of law to consider it in its duality and plasticity, both 
as an “ideological framework structuring labour rela‑
tions, and as a symbolic and material resource, whose 
usage can change the current content and forms of 
domination” (Pélisse, 2009, p. 82).
First, I will discuss the relatively recent history 
of this industry, which is characterized by the joint 
institutionalization of the branch and of its trade 
unions. I will demonstrate the limits of an analysis 
in terms of the disconnection between employees 
and their representatives. Describing the condi‑
tions of institutionalization of the direct distribution 
of printed matter sector helps, in turn, in putting 
the implications of the 2008 Act into perspective. 
In fact, we can only grasp the changes induced by 
the new regime of representation by comparing the 
sequence of events following this reform to those 
which preceded it. In the second part, I demonstrate 
how the mobilisation of the new rules of union repre‑
sentation have transformed the reality of the unions 
in the sector, both in terms of employee represen‑
tation as well as in social dialogue. In this regard, 
the unique coniguration of the sector as a virtual 
duopoly, facilitates the comparison and analysis of 
interactions between the branch and the irms.
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Box 3
Material and Sources
This article is based on materials collected in 
the course of on-going research on the implemen-
tation of the reform of August 2008 “On the impro-
vement of social democracy”. (1) Since March 2010, 
I have interviewed various actors in the sector: two 
representatives of the Labour Ministry’s administra-
tion; sixteen union negotiators and representatives 
at the branch level; stewards and union activists at 
the two main irms of direct distribution of printed 
matter; the representative of a “free” trade union of 
the management personnel; and a representative 
of the corporate management. I also had access 
to the records of the representative of the General 
Directorate of Labour (DGT) who had more or less 
directly followed labour relations in the sector since 
2000. These include reports of joint bilateral commit-
tees; correspondence of the social partners with 
the DGT; the internal communications of the DGT; 
various union documents; and the “liaison iles”, 
minutes of the activities of the Presidents of the 
Joint Commission (PCM) representing the Ministry 
of Labour in the collective bargaining sessions. I 
collected much of the material (union lealets, testi-
monies and analyses, newspaper articles) in paper 
form or on the websites of trade unions and several 
blogs and forums of sector employees. Finally, I 
attended a three-day meeting/training session of 
activists and union representatives from both irms, 
as well as the meeting of a joint committee and a 
bilateral working group at the branch level.
(1) Research done for the Dares (2010‑12) conducted 
with Sophie Béroud, Jean‑Michel Denis, Marnix Dressen, 
Maïlys Gantois, Cécile Guillaume and Donna Kesselman. 
Direct distribution of printed matter (DD) is only one sector 
among others covered in this survey.
Institutionalization and Unionization 
of Direct Distribution of Printed 
Matter
According to the classical pattern of institutional‑
ization, which can be found both in Rosanvallon and 
his followers (Duclos, Mériaux, 2009) as well as in 
the neo‑corporatist literature (e. g., Offe, 1985), the 
union which has its power guaranteed by the state 
is no longer concerned with its real base among the 
wage earners. The living reality of work gradually 
escapes it and it risks losing its ability to mediate. 
This pattern is a priori well suited to explaining the 
establishment of the union in the direct distribution 
of printed matter sector essentially “from the top.” 
Two sequences can be distinguished: the founda‑
tion phase corresponding to the establishment of 
conventional standards and the institutionalization 
phase, corresponding to the subsequent stage of the 
routinization of the system of rules.
Foundation of the Branch 
and Union Recognition
For a long time the distribution of unaddressed 
printed matter was dispersed among very different 
professional worlds: on the one hand, the postal 
world, and on the other, that of the press and adver‑
tising. The irst attempt to introduce advertising 
into the postal delivery rounds was in 1953‑56 and 
it was cancelled due to union resistance. It was 
repeated at the beginning of the 1970s on a volun‑
tary basis. The postal agents were divided between 
those who accepted and those who refused to do 
this work which was accompanied by additional 
compensation (Cartier, 2003). In the private sector 
of advertising agencies and media companies, the 
activity was, as in the delivery of the press, mainly 
paid by piecework wages. Piecework wages are 
based on a commercial law service contract: “the 
irm buys a global service counted in number of 
pieces to be produced, negotiating a unit price 
which in the industry’s jargon is called a ‘chan-
tier’ [job] or a ‘lot’”(Célérier, 2012, p. 91). Here 
the job is deined as the number of mailboxes to 
which one has to deliver. For irms that use this 
type of service, this is a way of externalizing costs 
as well as occupational hazards. Workers, called 
distributors, perform some work at home (prepar‑
ing bundles of prospectus to be put into mailboxes) 
and provide their own work tools (walking shoes 
and clothing to cope with the weather, vehicles to 
get to the work site, trolleys to carry bundles, etc.). 
They are solely responsible for the conditions for 
the realization of their service, which can particu‑
larly lead to mobilizing the whole family, the 
spouse and children who make a free contribution 
to the job. Denigrated by the postal worker unions, 
which were attached to the spirit of public service 
and saw this as commercial “dirty work,” the activ‑
ity was in the meantime barely visible in the private 
sector. Giving rise to multiple informal arrange‑
ments negotiated privately between distributors 
and contractors, the press and advertising unions 
considered it just as peripheral as it was dificult to 
understand.
Paid by piecework, distributors were issued 
contracts that offered no guarantee of compliance 
with the hourly SMIC (minimum wage), which was 
illegal. That is why in the early 1990s the General 
Directorate of Labour [DGT, Direction générale du 
travail, a division of the Labour Ministry] invited 
the irms involved in this ield of activity to reach an 
agreement with the union confederations presumed 
to be representative so as to give contractual protec‑
tion to workers in line with the generalization of 
contracts by branch launched in the late 1970s 
(Tallard, 2004). A leader of the FO (Force ouvrière, 
Workers Power) union of publishing, media and 
advertising, who was one of the architects of the 
sectorial contract, underlined the reactive nature of 
this union “concern”: “We plunged into the subject, 
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what is direct distribution of printed matter? Of 
course there was no unionization.” (8) Unions were 
invited to submit proposals: expanding the scope 
of an existing agreement or negotiating an ad hoc 
text. The position of this unionist was to negotiate 
an annex to the collective agreement for the logis‑
tics of direct publications. But the creation of a 
speciic employer organization, the Union of direct 
distribution of printed matter (SDD, Syndicat de  la 
distribution directe) in 1994, reoriented the nego‑
tiations towards the production of an autonomous 
text. Initially, there was an evident convergence of 
interests between employers and unions. For the 
unions, negotiation at the national level was a way 
of compensating for their absence from the work‑
place. Such negotiating by branch is a well‑known 
practice. It has particularly helped FO ind a place 
in the union movement (Bergounioux, 1975). For 
its part, forced by the public authorities “to legalize 
its activities,” the SDD was prepared to tolerate the 
unions at the level of the branch as long as they kept 
out of the irms. (9) Should this really be described, 
however, as unionization from above with, as a 
result, the original sin of “rootless” organizations 
conined to the arena of bi-lateral negotiations and 
supported more by institutional recognition rather 
than by that of the distributors themselves? In 
reality, the dynamics of the negotiations progres‑
sively changed the situation.
In the initial phase of development of contrac‑
tual rules, collective bargaining at the branch level 
helped establish a union presence. While the irst 
union negotiators were external to the industry 
(they were full‑time union representatives from 
the world of media and advertising), they shared 
a common desire of linking up with the distribu‑
tors. The unions established a presence in irms by 
advancing their goal, announced during bi‑lateral 
negotiations, “to make distribution a real profes‑
sion” and challenging piecework wages in the 
courts, in industrial tribunals (10) and in workplace 
strikes. The circumstances and the rhythm of 
bargaining at the branch level were thus determined 
by the exchange of blows that were played out in 
other areas. Similarly, the participation of workers 
from the branch in trade union delegations was 
one of the issues in a confrontation with the SDD, 
which the unions at times accused of not keeping 
(8) Interview, 24 January 2012.
(9) More speciically, there was a union presence in some 
companies, but it was tolerated to the extent that it accepted 
the logic of piece work, as evidenced by some company agree‑
ments negotiated in the early 1990s. Otherwise repression was 
the norm.
(10) Appeals to the labour tribunals regularly led to the reclas‑
siication of the distributors’ contracts to permanent full-time 
contracts (CDI). The problem of the distributors’ employment 
contract has repeatedly been pointed out by labour inspectors or 
in the courts, such as the district courts, starting from the related 
issue of employee representation (this in fact is determined by 
calculations using full‑time equivalents).
its commitments to cover travel costs, a condition 
for the non‑Parisians who were not full‑time staff to 
participate in negotiations. The presence of distribu‑
tion workers provided experience‑based knowledge 
which encouraged discussion, but as evidenced by 
the minutes of meetings, it was the full time union 
federation representatives who conducted the nego‑
tiations. In addition to calling on a variety of skills, 
including rhetorical and legal, and coordinating 
union action on these multiple fronts, the full time 
staff ensured continuity while workers from the 
ranks changed regularly: “For us, our delegates 
were always being ired,” a CGT oficial told me in 
an interview. (11) He understood this as a testimony 
to the integrity of his delegation, blaming some 
unions for having recruited workers who were not 
clearly independent vis-à-vis the employer. But it 
also demonstrates the fragility of the establishment 
of the unions, conirming the declaration of an FO 
full‑time staff worker who was interviewed and said 
that before the establishment of the CCN, “union 
representation was ridiculous and ephemeral.”
The negotiations, which had been blocked, were 
reopened with the arrival on the employers’ side of 
an actor who was more open to “social dialogue.” 
The 2003 merger‑acquisition by the La Poste group 
of the company Gratuit, (12) a traditional distribu‑
tion market operator, marked the beginning of this 
public operator’s role in the private distribution 
market. Following the acquisition, the unions of 
La Poste began to penetrate the sector, organizing 
the distributors, sometimes in competition with the 
unions of the same union confederation, (13) and 
taking part in the negotiations. Gratuit proclaimed 
its intention of spreading the group’s “social model” 
among the distributors and encouraged a number of 
concessions. The company generalized part‑time 
permanent work contracts (CDI [contrat à durée 
indéterminée]), made commitments in terms of 
improving working conditions, vocational train‑
ing, etc. These company agreements preceded 
and pushed forward the conclusion of the branch 
agreement.
A compromise was inally signed in the National 
Collective Agreement (CCN) of direct distribution 
of printed matter. The text was signed on 9 February 
2004 by the SDD and the unions and federations 
afiliated to the ive confederations. It was “étendu” 
[made compulsory for the entire industry] by order 
of the Ministry of Labour on 16 July 2004 and came 
into force the following year, on 1st July 2005. The 
(11) Interview, 24 January 2012.
(12) Gratuit was created in 1987 as a subsidiary of La Poste [the 
public Postal service] offering irms direct marketing services. 
It extended its activity to the distribution of unaddressed adver‑
tising by merging with a distribution irm bought from a media 
group which was a rival to the group which owned Distrib.
(13) This is particularly true of the CGT federations of the 
postal service and of book publishing and distribution.
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main change brought about by the establishment of 
the CCN was in oficially abandoning piecework 
wages. Since then, wages in the distribution sector 
have been based on a time measurement, recorded 
in permanent work contracts. But the status of 
distributor, structured by the CCN, is nonetheless 
atypical: it combines a modulated part‑time work 
contract (14) to a particular system of compensa‑
tion, called “préquantiication” that makes an 
a priori evaluation of the time required to accom‑
plish the distribution jobs. This system addresses 
the employers’ concern for “lexibility” in meeting 
the demands of the market through a special exemp‑
tion in the common labour law which imposes an 
ex post count of hours worked. The compromise of 
the CCN, endorsed by the General Directorate of 
Labour, exchanges this special exemption status in 
return for strong union recognition granting impor‑
tant union rights concerning both the branch as well 
as the irms (see Box 4).
Box 4
Union Rights in the National Collective 
Agreement (CCN) for Direct Distribution 
of Printed Matter
The CCN lays down common provisions across 
the entire sector in terms of trade union rights and 
representation of employees. Three of them deserve 
to be highlighted. The irst concerns irms: given the 
dispersion of distribution centres and the frequency 
of “short part-time contracts”, the CCN provides 
that a coeficient multiplier of 1.7 should be applied 
to the calculation of actual full-time equivalent jobs. 
This calculation is used in deining the workplaces, 
determining the number of positions in the employee 
representative bodies (IRP), and the number of 
hours of union delegation. The second provision 
relates to hours of union delegation: they are paid as 
time worked when taken during the working hours 
of the employee representative (RP [représentant du 
personnel]). When taken outside of working hours, 
they are considered as overtime and calculated on 
the basis of the minimum wage. The third provi-
sion relates to the branch: CCN provides that each 
signatory trade union organization has a “technical 
advisor” in charge of monitoring the affairs of the 
branch in the person of a full-time employee of one 
of the irms in the sector, temporarily assigned to 
this function. This is a rather unique provision: it is 
rare that the employers’ organisation directly pays 
for union activity.
The process of union organizing was thus 
promoted “from above,” but it was not limited to 
(14) Modulation refers to the potential created by a collective 
agreement to vary the workweek without resorting to overtime 
if the annual average weekly hours do not exceed the time spec‑
iied in the work contract. This device has been adopted in more 
than half of the RTT (reduction of working time) agreements 
between 1998 and 2000 (Pélisse, 2003).
“summit unionism”: union recognition went beyond 
the scope of the arena of bi‑lateral negotiations to 
become rooted inside the irms themselves, even 
during the negotiations, and this was then included 
in the text of the CCN.
Anxiety Over Representativity: 
the Difficulties in Legitimizing 
the Branch Compromise
While the “unionization from above” hypothesis 
is wrong, would it be more appropriate to counter‑
pose the initial foundation phase of institution, the 
foundation phase conducive to unionization since 
it necessitated the active mobilization of interests, 
from the subsequent phase of institutionalization, 
marked by the demobilization of distributors and the 
establishment of their representatives’ own inter‑
ests? Thus we once again ind the pattern in which 
once legal representation has been established, it is 
no longer necessary to activate social representa‑
tiveness. The initial phase of unity is followed by a 
phase of demobilization or differentiation of inter‑
ests, resulting in a “risk of the loss of recognition 
for organizations whose future is now guaranteed 
and who no longer have the interest or capac‑
ity to demonstrate their social representativeness” 
(Offerlé, 1998, p. 72). In fact, there were various 
expressions of distrust of the organizations asso‑
ciated with the professional branch compromise, 
leading to the emergence of new players claiming to 
represent the distributors. However, these phenom‑
ena cannot be summarized as a general pattern of 
the disconnection between institutionalized unions 
and discontented distributors.
The dispute initially arose from within the 
unions themselves at the time the collective agree‑
ment was signed. Some unionists did not accept 
the compromise over the special exemption. Their 
action in the ield had been on behalf of the stand‑
ardization of wages in the sector. One interviewee 
mentioned the case of a distributor representing 
the CFTC (French Confederation of Christian 
Workers) “who came to commission meetings with 
the labour code under his arm” and was dismissed 
by his confederation who accused him of block‑
ing the conclusion of the negotiations. Some of 
the unions from La Poste were amongst the most 
critical of the outcome of the negotiations, seeing 
the formalization of the status of distributor as ulti‑
mately a risk for the status of the postal worker. 
Thus, the FAPT‑CGT refused to sign the CCN, but 
was deterred from demonstrating its opposition 
following internal arbitration inside the confed‑
eration, the CGT’s signature being provided by 
FILPAC. (15) But tensions occurred mainly between 
(15) The FAPT is the Federation of Postal and Tele‑
communications Activities; the FILPAC is the Federation of 
Workers in the Book, Paper and Communication industries.
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the players involved in the bilateral arena and 
those activists present in the irm, as evidenced by 
the testimony of a CFDT union representative:
“[the CCN] was implemented at Gratuit on 5 July 
[2005], we went on strike on July 5. […] I would 
not deny that as a central delegate, in 2005, I sent 
a registered letter to my federation, saying it should 
denounce this contract.” (16)
In their concrete application in the workplace, 
the new rules of the branch compromise decreased 
direct compensation. A distributor, a former CGT 
militant who started at Gratuit in 2000, spoke up 
with others against the CCN: “We compared pay 
slips.” Another employee, a former activist of 
the National Union of Autonomous Trade Unions 
(UNSA) who had worked at Gratuit well before 
its takeover by the group La Poste, noted that the 
application of the contract had divided his salary by 
three. This is what was summed up by the FO nego‑
tiator interviewed:
“Why is it that we, the trade unions, were attacked 
when this agreement was published? It is that in the 
context of this reform there has been a fairly substan-
tial decrease in the amount of reimbursed expenses, 
mileage, etc. But what we wanted was a real profes-
sionalization, with wages which would lead to having 
rights in social questions, welfare and others. So there 
has been a transfer. But the transfer was not equal.” (17)
However, criticism of the agreement was not 
the reaction only of the “old” distributors who 
remembered the working conditions prior to the 
establishment of the branch. If that had been the 
only question, then the turnover and repression 
of protesters would eventually have exhausted 
the source of criticism. But social conlict was 
continuous in the sector. Paradoxically, the distrib‑
utor status itself, while strengthening the lexible 
organization of employment, helped disseminate 
the dispute. By objectifying the condition of 
atypical employees, it led distributors to think of 
themselves as employees while in practice it kept 
them at the frontier of wage earners. Profane criti‑
cism thus developed among distributors alongside 
expert criticism conducted in the name of the law 
by labour inspectors dissatisied with this infringe‑
ment of the Labour Code.
Some distributors did not hesitate at interpret‑
ing the industry’s compromise agreement as a 
cynical exchange between employers favouring 
their own economic interests and union representa‑
tives preoccupied with their bureaucratic interests. 
In this context, the mobilization of distributors was 
a manipulation by union oficials to inluence the 
negotiation, before abandoning them to their fate 
once the agreement had been signed. Also advanced 
(16) Interview, 12 April 2012.
(17) Interview, 24 January 2012.
was the argument that the unions were “bought” 
with a post as technical advisor, in which the SDD 
inanced a full time oficial for the branch for each 
union signatory to the agreement.
This analysis was given even more credit by the 
fact that all the confederations recognized as repre‑
sentative in the industry supported the compromise. 
The divorce between the distributors and the unions 
is explicitly proclaimed on the “forum of the Union 
of employees of direct distribution of printed matter 
and of postal activities (USDDAP).” This internet 
site, created in 2005, illustrates the emergence of 
forms of action alternative to the trade unions. This 
site denounces “the active complicity of the trade 
union federations of the branch in their assistance 
provided to employers in the exploitation of the 
distributors and the massive and illegal practice 
of undeclared work.” On this site, the distributors 
centralize legal information and share advice on 
negotiating their employment contract or defending 
their rights against the employer. A section of the 
forum even announced in 2007 the establishment of 
an USDDAP guide,
“which will include on the one hand an assessment 
of the depots, on the other hand an evaluation of 
shop stewards and union delegates. This informa‑
tion will allow applicants for distributor or postal 
worker jobs to know in which depot of his area it is 
best to submit an application. It will also assist active 
employees to know for whom to vote in the various 
elections, particularly in employee elections, and who 
to avoid.” (18)
Some expressions were simply totally exterior 
to unionism, as in this letter from a distributor to 
the Director of the General Directorate of Labour 
on January 25, 2011, which asked that “the legal 
rights of the Labour Code no longer be diverted 
by agreements between partners.” It is true that 
the role of technical advisor gave some reality 
to the representation of a threatening world of 
“social partners,” quite distant from the distribu‑
tors. The ofice created the position of an expert 
in distribution activities, socially distinct from the 
activity itself. This was not compensated for by 
the proile of committed trade unionists: among 
the currently employed advisors, only one of them 
is a former distributor, and he had no longer been 
one for quite some time before he came to ofice 
(he had been promoted to warehouseman and 
then became a full‑time union staff worker), and 
another is totally outside of the sector as he is a 
retired postal worker.
It is too schematic, however, to link these diverse 
phenomena to the rejection of unions by the distrib‑
utors. First, because the establishment of SUD‑PTT, 
(18) Source: the forum of the USDDAP: http://convdistribu‑
tion.bbfr.net/forum, accessed 4 April 2012; access reserved to 
identiied users of the forum.
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a union which had been outside the sector, was 
also fed by the criticisms of the unions which had 
signed the CCN. In fact, many representatives of 
this organization had come from competing unions 
(UNSA, CGT, CFDT, etc.) which were accused of 
being too conciliatory vis-à-vis the employers. But 
the union signatories of the CCN also contributed 
to shaping the criticisms of those employees dissat‑
isied with their condition. Unions, whatever their 
confederation, are in fact the most common instru‑
ment utilised in the many labour court disputes 
over the recognition of the work of the distributors. 
They are present in the strikes on compensation 
issues or working conditions that regularly affect 
the warehouses. Thus, we should not forget that 
the formalization of labour relations has also led 
to publicizing and legitimizing the unions, both 
directly and indirectly. Through the signing of the 
CCN, the employers in the sector had recognized 
the legitimacy of union representation, which went 
beyond the level of the industry, and was expected 
to be closely linked to greater union presence in 
the irms. Thus, in the wake of the CCN agreement, 
new agreements or amendments in application of 
the new rules on trade union rights were negotiated 
in various companies in 2005. This particularly 
concerned the application of the coeficient factor 
used to determine the number of representative 
ofices. At Distrib, the company was obliged to 
redeine its relationship to the unions, as evidenced 
by a supervisory manager:
“There was nevertheless a negative image of unions. 
Even I also had this view… […] The agreement has 
led to many advances. I do not know if this is because 
of writing up the rights and obligations of employ-
ees… there was a strong rise in social policies. […] 
We had to form a social relations network.” (19)
The CCN has also accompanied –and probably 
accelerated– an economic reorganization of the 
sector which has also contributed to the increas‑
ing union presence. Along with the entry of new 
operator, Gratuit, on the market, its main competi‑
tor, Distrib, embarked on a strategy of acquisitions. 
Some of the irms which it acquired already had 
union representation, especially in the southwest 
of France. The market for the direct distribution of 
printed matter was actually the front line in a war 
which the two main operators had been preparing 
with the liberalization of the postal market in the 
background. (20) The increased competition led to 
the creation of a virtual duopoly through successive 
(19) Interview, 7 December 2010.
(20) In the context of the liberalization of the postal market, 
Distrib decided at the time to invest in the sector of addressed 
mail. In 2006, the company became the irst private operator 
to acquire a “postal license.” Although Distrib inally decided 
not to compete with the Post Ofice in a market which has been 
fully liberalized since 1 February 2011, the company partici‑
pates, through the Union of Postal Operators, in the negotiations 
leading to a collective agreement for postal activities.
purchases and the liquidation of less competitive 
irms, while economic proitability imperatives 
within each irm were becoming stronger. It is just 
as much due to the establishment of the CCN as it 
is to the integration of local structures into national 
entities that labour relations have progressively 
been transformed from a local mode to a bureau‑
cratic one, ruling out –and sometimes making 
technically impossible (21)– informal local arrange‑
ments. Several of the activists encountered justiied 
their union involvement during the 2000s by a 
deteriorating climate in the workplace due to these 
changes.
In addition, while it created the conditions for 
greater union involvement of employees, the CCN 
did this based on a utilitarian relationship with the 
unions, maintaining an interest in unionization 
which was less oriented towards defending the 
“gains” of the agreement than it was to obtaining 
beneits for oneself. There is abundant evidence 
from various union activists about union repre‑
sentatives or elected delegates without any “trade 
union consciousness.” In a manner similar to that 
which exists in agency employment, holding a 
union post is a complement to one’s initial wage 
(Grollier, 2010). Posts can be used by the distribu‑
tors as a “bonus” or even as a cost imposed on the 
company in order to raise the stakes in negotiating 
a dismissal (and, after 2008, a contractual termi‑
nation) or in pressuring the employers to offer a 
promotion. They could also be offered as recom‑
pense by the employer himself. These practices, 
which are deviant with respect to the activist norm 
of legitimate disinterestedness, can be understood 
in the speciic context, both social and legal, which 
forms them. While part‑time work along with job 
insecurity and low wages continue to dominate 
the sector, the CCN established a relative unlink‑
ing of the opening of worker rights and of trade 
union rights, while the absence of work groups and 
the personalization of relations with lower super‑
visory personnel facilitated individual strategies. 
In addition, interviews with unionized distributors 
show how utilitarian interests and an “interest in 
disinterestedness” (Bourdieu, 1984) intertwine and 
are continuously redeined in the course of a union 
career.
Therefore the institutionalization of the sector 
through the branch agreement did not mean cutting 
the unions off from the distributors. Instead, it had 
two partly contradictory effects: on the one hand, it 
promoted the dissemination of the union form as a 
legal resource and its adaptation inside irms through 
various channels, and on the other hand, it stabilized 
an arena of additional representation having its own 
logic, that of the branch. This reconiguration has 
(21) The calculation of such remuneration is further deined by 
the introduction of computer software.
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created a structural tension, a tension that not only 
opposes distributors and union representatives, but 
also runs through each of the unions present in both 
areas. The landscape of direct distribution of printed 
matter, as shaped by the CCN, thus resembles an 
unstable arrangement that the 2008 reform may 
have inally shaken.
The Contradictory Dynamics of 
“Industrial Democracy”: What the 
2008 Reform Changed
The 2008 reform gives greater importance to 
personnel elections than had been the case in the 
previous coniguration. By subordinating the legal 
representation of the union to the electoral expres‑
sion of the employees, it expressly aimed at bringing 
the two above‑mentioned dimensions of represen‑
tation (legal and social) closer to each other in the 
name of “industrial democracy.” We have previ‑
ously seen that the law lends itself to multiple uses. 
It should not, therefore, have a mechanical effect. 
The way in which the new rules of representation 
were applied in the two main irms in the branch 
demonstrated this. Beyond its application, however, 
the 2008 reform involved a reconiguration of the 
legal system that put an end to the structural discon‑
nection between representation in the irm and 
representation in the branch.
Ambivalent Unionization in the Firm
The reform of trade union representation rein‑
forced the trend to the unionization of labour 
relations that had been advanced by the institution‑
alization of the branch. This is particularly clear in 
the case of Distrib. While granting new means to 
the trade unions, the irm maintained, according 
to the unionists who were interviewed, a policy 
of “containment” of unions. This was relected in 
particular by its support for non‑union candidates 
in the elections of shop stewards (DP [délégués du 
personnel]) and to the works council (CE [comité 
d’entreprise]) which led to the “neutralization” 
of the employees’ representative bodies (IRP 
[instances représentatives du personnel]). The 
supposed close relations between the majority of 
the CE and management meant that the latter did 
not have to face any obstacles in those proceedings 
which required the council’s opinion, whether in 
the dismissal of protected employees, the moni‑
toring of the typologies of préquantiication or in 
the irm’s economic and social policy. When the 
IRP were re‑elected in 2010, the application of the 
2008 Act changed the rules of the game. Those 
candidates who previously had not been members 
of a union shifted to the lists of an autonomous 
union, the Autonomous Confederation of Labour 
(CAT). (22) Its founder in the company acknowl‑
edged having had the idea following a training 
session organized by management and led by 
consultants who were external to the company. (23) 
The suppression of the irrefutable presumption of 
representativeness has also enabled SUD‑PTT to 
participate in the negotiation of the pre‑election 
protocol agreement and to establish its organisa‑
tion. (24) Some transitory union representatives 
(RSS [représentants de section syndicale]) were 
appointed prior to the election, but only in those 
warehouses where there were chances of their 
getting elected. (25) All the unions increased in 
number of votes and expanded their organisations, 
relecting the efforts made in confronting the new 
question of representativeness. The increase in 
voter turnout in the irst round (which reached 
38.33% as compared to 17.05% in the previous 
election in 2007) and the decline in blank and 
spoiled ballots (from 18.38% to 10.31%) thus has 
a two‑fold explanation: it was not only labour, but 
also the irm’s management who were interested in 
the outcome of the election. In a context in which 
more or less restrictive injunctions to bargaining 
at the irm level were increasing, the fact that the 
new rules subordinated unions’ authority to sign 
agreements to their electoral representativeness 
led the employers, according to some interview‑
ees, to bet on an independent union in the irst 
round rather than on a second round open to non‑
union candidates. With 13.4% of the votes cast in 
the irst round, the CAT won representativity. SUD 
did not reach the 10% threshold, but by approach‑
ing 8%, the union received enough votes to allow 
it to claim representativity at the branch level. For 
the irst time in the irm’s history, a union major‑
ity had won a majority of the works council, thus 
activating a number of legal powers (especially in 
terms of economic expertise) which until then had 
remained dormant.
The situation at Gratuit, where union presence 
had become an established fact, was more compli‑
cated due to the presence of many organizations: 
CGT, CFDT, FO, CFTC, CFE‑CGC (French 
Confederation of Management Personnel‑General 
Confederation of Executives), UNSA, SUD‑PTT. 
The public operator had brought with it the 
language of “social dialogue” and an expertise in the 
(22) This little known organization boasts an existence since 
1953. It has a website: http://www.c‑a‑t.fr/
(23) Interview, 7 December 2010.
(24) SUD‑PTT, which is developing a group strategy, gained 
a foothold in the direct distribution of printed matter when 
Gratuit, owned by La Poste, entered the distribution market. 
The union was able to impose its representativeness in Gratuit 
despite the opposition of the company and could present lists in 
the irst round of professional elections in 2007.
(25) Indeed, if the union represented by an RSS has not reached 
the threshold of representation after the elections, another 
employee must be designated RSS and the status of protected 
employee disappears after six months.
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management of collective labour relations which 
sharply differed from the anti‑union policy that had 
previously existed in the sector: “Voting is an act of 
a ‘corporate citizen’ which should be encouraged 
so as to fully express democracy in the irm,” read 
the pre‑electoral Memorandum of Agreement in 
2007. The effort made in electoral organization at 
the time had led to greatly increasing the participa‑
tion rate which went from less than 30% to 49.9% 
between the 2005 and 2007 elections. It reached 
62.2% in the next election in 2011. Management 
was accustomed to negotiating –“in ive years I had 
to sign 36 agreements,” said the current Director 
of Human Resources (26)– and had its preferred 
partners, which changed with the issues but often 
included two “small” unions: UNSA and the 
CFTC. In a irm which has an established practice 
of social dialogue, hostility vis-à-vis the employer 
does not serve as social cement: it is competition 
rather than cooperation between unions that seems 
to prevail. For several years, a local CGT union 
existed concurrently in the irm alongside a federal 
CGT representation, the organizational transla‑
tion of the structural tension between the levels 
of the branch and the irm. During the personnel 
elections in October 2011, lists of SUD‑Gratuit 
competed with lists of SUD‑PTT. This dissent was 
facilitated by the structure of the IRP which, unlike 
its counterpart at Distrib, is decentralized. Not all 
unions presented candidates in the six works coun‑
cils and not all the unions attained the threshold of 
representativity. The 2011 elections thus resulted 
in a union representation with variable geometry. 
Only the CFDT and CGT were representative 
organizations in all works councils. FO, CFTC and 
SUD-PTT were respectively representative in ive, 
four and three of the six works councils. The UNSA 
was the big loser. It was only recognized as repre‑
sentative at one work unit and lost its representation 
at the national level of the irm thus depriving the 
management of a privileged partner in the irm’s 
negotiations. SUD‑Gratuit, which had presented 
lists in two regions, did not attain representation at 
any level.
The new representativity rules authorized 
various legal “tactics” on the part of trade unions or 
employers. In the Memorandum of Understanding 
concerning the shop steward elections, Distrib 
management introduced a clause excluding heads 
of warehouses from the electorate. By depriv‑
ing them of an electoral sanction, it cut the grass 
under the feet of unions such as the CFTC which 
had started their unionization, designating some 
of them as union delegates. Similarly, SUD‑PTT 
managed to deal a fatal blow to the CGC by chal‑
lenging the categorical identity of the organization 
all the way to the Court of Cassation. In the irst 
(26) Interview, 18 January 2012.
round of the 8 October 2010 elections, the CGC 
union had only presented candidates in the second 
and third electoral colleges and had its representa‑
tiveness recognized on this categorical basis. Since 
the quorum was not reached, a second round of the 
elections was held on 19 November 2010. This time 
the CGC introduced lists in all the three electoral 
colleges. Crossing this fact with the union constitu‑
tion which says that it represents “subject to certain 
conditions, the employees,” the Court concluded, 
in a decision of 31 January 2012, that the repre‑
sentativeness of the CGC should be measured by 
combining all three colleges, which had the effect 
of depriving the union of its representativity and 
cancelling the appointment of its central union 
delegate. The site of the FO‑Distrib section wrote 
that “while management systematically attacks the 
designation of union employees whenever it can, 
it took the trade union SUD to attack the union of 
management personnel in order that justice was 
done.”
For Gratuit, the subdivision of the professional 
representation in the regional works council was 
determined by the 2007 elections. The General 
Directorate of Labour had responded to a request 
of the CGT for arbitration by imposing this 
decentralization. One month later, the Gratuit 
management denounced the section of the irm’s 
2005 collective agreement concerning trade union 
rights: it associated its proposals for the region‑
alization of trade union rights to a reduction of 
some of its resources, which led to an “Agreement 
on Social Dialogue in Gratuit” in January 2009 
with only three unions signing (CFTC, FO and 
UNSA). A clause in the agreement, of innocu‑
ous appearance at the time, was to have important 
consequences:
“The provisions concerning union representa‑
tives will apply until the next elections in all works 
councils. They shall cease to apply as of right after 
the announcement of the election results so as to 
be in conformity with the law of 20 August 2008 
for the section concerning the renewal of indus‑
trial democracy. A new negotiation will begin 
within six months preceding the date of the irst 
round.”
The negotiation took place, however, after the 
elections. According to a central union repre‑
sentative interviewed “having the negotiations 
prior to the election would have allowed unions, 
if they were not representative, to see what would 
happen to them. The management did not want 
this, as it would involve greater expenses.” (27) 
This postponement of the negotiations had addi‑
tional consequences following the legal decision of 
10 November 2010. In that decision, the Court of 
(27) Interview, 5 October 2012.
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Cassation decided that the works council and not 
the shop stewards determined the default perimeter 
for the designation of the union representative. (28) 
In practice, this meant the disappearance of the 
workplace union representative at Gratuit, since 
the level of representation of the works council 
was the region. (29) Following the elections, the 
management had most designations of union repre‑
sentatives annulled by the District Court, (30) while 
proposing negotiations on a draft agreement which 
recognized “a separate institution understood in the 
sense of the works council,” as the perimeter for 
the designation of union representatives. In a joint 
statement in November 2011, the unions accused 
management of wanting to “suppress union repre‑
sentatives on all production sites so as to further 
isolate employees and remove unions from the 
workplace.” (31) Despite the opposition of a major‑
ity of organizations, an agreement was signed on 
7 June 2012 with FO, CGC and CFTC, which 
barely represented the required 30% relative major‑
ity (32.8%). Paradoxically, the application of the 
reform at Gratuit thus led to a restriction in union 
representation. In 2010, according to the irm’s 
social balance sheet, 393 union delegates had actu‑
ally been appointed according to the rules in force 
at the time. According to the document signed in 
2012, depending on the coniguration of repre‑
sentative organizations and taking all organizations 
into account, the maximum number of delegates 
that could possibly be named had been reduced to 
179. (32)
The comparison of the two companies allows us 
to qualify the assumption that the reform would 
be a fulcrum for trade union development. On this 
point, the question of representative posts is crucial: 
the irst step towards a commitment is usually 
obtaining a designated or elective representative 
position, because it offers legal protection. This is 
why the active units of the union are frequently 
limited to employees with union posts. In sectors 
with little job security, fear of employer retaliation 
is much stronger as it can be both more dramatic 
(28) In several judgments of 10 November 2010, conirmed by 
a judgment of 18 May 2011, the social chamber of the Court 
of Cassation reversed legal precedent: it aligned its deinition 
of the concept of a distinct entity, as the framework for the 
designation of a union representative, on that formulated by the 
State Council, that is, a separate institution understood as corre‑
sponding to the framework of the election of the works council 
and not to a speciic workplace.
(29) While the works council is national at Distrib, the 
company agreement which organizes the designation of union 
representatives by work place of at least 50 full‑time equivalent 
employees is still in force.
(30) Only four judgments were in favour of unions and will 
have to go to the Court of Cassation.
(31) “Préalable à toute négociation,” a statement of the 
union coordinating committee CFDT‑CFTC‑CGT‑FO‑SUD at 
Gratuit, November 2011.
(32) This data should continue to evolve in 2013 following a 
management plan to reorganize the perimeters of the company.
and less visible. However, the necessary electoral 
benediction for union representative [DS, délégué 
syndical] restricts the pool of nominations. It 
prevents using the post of union representative 
as a position for the recognized establishment of 
a union section, which the creation of the post of 
transitory union representative [RSS, représent-
ant de section syndicale] only partially offsets: 
besides the fact that the latter ofice has fewer 
means available, it is allowed to establish unions 
only within those perimeters where an organiza‑
tion has not demonstrated its representativeness. 
Speciically, it is impossible for the CGT, FO, 
CFDT, CFTC and the CAT, all representative 
organizations at Distrib, to appoint union repre‑
sentatives in the workplaces in which they have 
not previously presented candidates in the elec‑
tions. Paradoxically, only SUD‑PTT, CFE‑CGC or 
new outsiders can be legally established through 
the designation of transitory union representatives. 
At Gratuit, the contradiction was resolved in a 
manner unfavourable to union representation, the 
employer’s position being based on the legal deci‑
sions reducing the perimeter for the designation of 
a union representative to that of the works council. 
The centrality given to the criteria of the elec‑
toral base in determining representativity initially 
resulted in legitimizing a deinition of trade union 
activity centred on social dialogue rather than on 
the workplace. In the direct distribution of printed 
matter sector, this change had the effect of moving 
the reality of the sector a little further away from 
the ideal scheme which dominated the branch 
compromise: the acceptance of a special exemp‑
tion status for distributors by union negotiators 
was conditional on establishing monitoring bodies 
at the branch level (technical advisors) as well as 
at the unit level (IRP), the connection between 
these two levels to be ensured by the unions. In 
addition, the new legal framework leads to a closer 
link between the conditions of union representa‑
tion and the collective agreements (pre‑election 
protocols and agreements on union rights) which 
in each irm organize the perimeters of employee 
representation. It follows that the “effects” of 
the law are even less understandable outside the 
speciic conigurations for each irm, as illustrated 
by the paradox of a restriction of trade union pres‑
ence in the irm assumed to be the most open to 
social dialogue while the unionization of the irm 
seen as the most anti‑union was advanced.
Towards the Definitive Destabilization 
of the Branch Compromise?
Do the new rules, while not necessarily 
strengthening trade union presence, neverthe‑
less create closer representative links? The most 
direct and intended effect of the reform was that 
industrial democracy should become a substitute 
for the failure of union democracy as a means of 
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increasing workers’ control over their representa‑
tives. In fact, control is less direct than indirect 
through the power of sanctions which gives 
voters the right of the non‑renewal of outgoing 
candidates. It is therefore impossible to measure 
its effects in a single electoral cycle. But the 
extent of turnover among employees in direct 
distribution of printed matter, as opposed to the 
tendency to lengthen the term of ofice (it is now 
four years, not counting the extensions following 
the disagreements during the negotiations of the 
pre‑election protocols), makes the introduction 
of such a constraint on the action of representa‑
tives highly unlikely. Moreover, the exercise of 
that control would imply that there is a “public 
sphere” (Habermas, 1993) enabling employees 
to become aware of the issues in the arena of 
social dialogue and to submit them to a reasoned 
critique. Has, for example, the new emphasis on 
elections given a higher proile to the controver‑
sial question of the status of distributors? Has this 
enabled distributors to choose among the unions 
with full knowledge of their positions on the 
issues? The possibilities of voters taking up such 
protest issues depend on how union players them‑
selves build their campaign. In consulting union 
members and their election material, the status of 
distributors is at best one question among others, 
and probably the least concrete. It appears as the 
background against which more immediate issues 
are played out: the transformation of the profes‑
sion linked to mechanization, working conditions 
and low pay. In addition, the direct impact of 
the works council elections primarily concerned 
social and cultural activities for the employ‑
ees, and the campaign centred in part on this 
point. These limits are written into the separa‑
tion between the procedures that organize social 
relations of representation and the questions to 
which they are supposed to respond. On the one 
hand, there is the tangible function of the works 
council, the framework for the organization of 
elections (the irm or the workplace) and, on the 
other hand, the questions of social dialogue, the 
most decisive of which are decided on the branch 
level. Insofar as elections, which now determine 
the relevant trade union landscape, take place in 
irms around multiple issues, the bilateral arena 
continues to work at “limiting the space for 
the circulation of controversy and debate” and 
to differentiate “responsible” actors, who are 
integrated into this debate, from those who are 
“irresponsible” and outside it (Henry, 2005).
It is thus the legal disputes rather than the elec‑
tion campaign that has contributed to publicizing 
the question of the status of distributors, espe‑
cially in denouncing the decrees of the Ministry 
of Labour, which had twice sought to juridically 
secure the system of préquantiication. (33) But 
these actions in the legal ield, while they expose 
the precarious condition of the distributors, have 
not led to a clariication of the union positions. 
At the same time that they go along with the criti‑
cism of the status of the distributors at the level of 
the irm, the union representatives at the branch 
level have never completely dissociated them‑
selves from it on the bilateral level. Thus, the only 
union signatory of the CCN which denounced the 
decree of 2010 (FO) did not do so in the name of 
the illegality of the measures (unlike SUD), but 
rather in the name of the “misapplication” of “good 
rules.” (34) As for the CGT, while it now declared 
in its lealets to favour a return to the effective 
control of working time based on a system which 
is “self‑declarative or which controls work and is 
activated by [employees] at the beginning and end 
of their shift”, (35) it has not attempted up to now to 
denounce the CCN nor to attack the decree before 
the Council of State. While the decision of the high 
court symbolically reinforced the position of SUD 
and the CGT, leading FO to advance the idea of an 
effective control of working time by geolocation, it 
has not meant an end to negotiations to amend the 
CCN in the same framework of a juridical exemp‑
tion. The SDD went as far as discussing the need to 
change the law, a possibility that is not rejected by 
some of the unions. The decision of the Council of 
State is still too recent and there may still be shifts 
in the position of the unions. The change in the 
parliamentary majority and with it, a shift of labour 
policies, could also affect the balance of power in 
the short term.
Beyond these economic uncertainties, the reform 
of trade union representation, however, could have 
the effect of undoing the structural tension by 
permanently destabilizing the branch compromise. 
At the branch level, the former system of represen‑
tation particularly practiced “social partnership”: 
it combined screening by the state (the irrefuta‑
ble presumption of representativeness of the ive 
“historical” confederations) and mutual recogni‑
tion (a branch is established through the signature 
of a CCN, and the actors, particularly the employ‑
ers, are established for signing a CCN). However, 
by basing union representativity at the branch level 
on the vote of the employees rather than the recog‑
nition by the employers’ representatives, the new 
system partially disconnects representation from the 
(33) A irst text, published in 2007, was denounced by 
SUD‑PTT and suppressed by the State Council in a judgment of 
11 March 2009. A second text, adopted in 2010, was denounced 
by SUD and FO and again suppressed in a decision of the State 
Council on 28 March 2012.
(34) The Council of State ruled in SUD’s favour recalling that 
only a law could allow a system of labour remuneration to be 
exonerated from monitoring real work time.
(35) “Temps de travail : le gouvernement passe en force !” 
FILPAC-CGT lealet, July 2010.
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logic of social partnership, while linking the bilat‑
eral arena to the irms. The likely evolution of the 
trade union representativity landscape at this level 
could jeopardize the compromise which is consti‑
tutive of the branch and which is written into the 
CCN. As we have seen, the acceptance of an excep‑
tional status for distributors had in return involved 
a strong institutional recognition of the unions. 
However, the new rules of representation tend to 
dissociate the terms of this exchange: on the basis 
of representativeness conquered at the polls, union 
actors such as SUD‑PTT who reject the exceptional 
status of distributors will claim the beneits of trade 
union rights in the CCN. At the same time, those 
union actors whose representativeness is threat‑
ened may be encouraged to reconsider their attitude 
towards the system. Up to now, the social partners 
have turned away from such fateful ordeals. In the 
aftermath of employee elections at Distrib (see 
table), SUD‑PTT questioned the social partners, 
demanding to be invited to bilateral meetings and 
simultaneously asked the General Directorate of 
Labour to initiate a study of representativeness. Its 
request went unanswered and was renewed in the 
fall of 2011 following new elections at the IRP at 
Gratuit. Based on the 2008 text which provides that 
the list of representative organizations is to be estab‑
lished at the end of an election cycle, the SDD and 
those unions which were considered representative 
under the earlier system postponed their decision 
until 2013. Meanwhile, the CGC’s loss of repre‑
sentativity at Distrib could provoke a chain reaction 
resulting in it losing its categorical representation at 
the level of the entire branch.
*  
*      *
Beyond the original question –does the 2008 
law help tighten the links between employees and 
their unions?– this text questions a central motif in 
the arguments made in justiication of the reform, 
but also in most analyses of trade unionism: is the 
problem of unions really one of their excessive insti‑
tutionalization? Contrary to common readings that 
combine “institutionalization” and “de‑unioniza‑
tion”, a return to the origins of the direct distribution 
of printed matter sector demonstrates that institu‑
tionalization also produces unionization. Far from 
cutting off the trade unions from their base, the 
launching of a process of institutionalized negotia‑
tion “from above” at the branch level resulted instead 
in the rapid establishment of a union presence “on 
the ground” in irms and workplaces. It forced the 
unions to mobilize workers in the sector and in return 
weighed on the sectorial negotiations by branch and 
irm. But for unions to thus be established as repre‑
sentatives of the distributors, it was necessary that 
the forms of work of the distributors themselves 
Table: Election Results for Union Organizations in the Branch
Distrib 
(elections of 8 October 2010)
Gratuit 
(elections from 10 to 
14 October 2011 and 4 May 
2012)
Aggregated results
Employees 20,511 13,215 33,726
Votes 7,851 (38.28%)
Votes cast 6,934 (33.81%) 8,158 (61.73%) 15,392 (45.64%)
Union
CGT 1,672 (24.11%) 1,838 (22.53%) 3,510 (22.80%)
CFDT 1,034 (14.91%) 2,015 (24.70%) 3,049 (19.81%)
CGT-FO 1,659 (23.93%) 1,334.13 (16.35%) 2,993.13 (19.45%)
CFTC 793 (11.44%) 1,091 (13.37%) 1,884 (12.24%)
UNSA 242 (3.49%) 524.44 (6.43%) 766.44 (4.98%)








CAT 929 (13.40%) 929 (6.04%)
SUD Gratuit 125 (1.53%) 125 (0.81%)
* AM [agents de maîtrise]: supervisory personnel.
Reading note: Results in bold type are relevant for legal representation.
The representation by category of the CFE-CGC at Distrib was annulled by the Court of Cassation. The results have been recalculated follow-
ing the annulation of the elections in the electoral college of employees in Burgundy Rhone-Alpes (BRA). New elections were held only in this 
electoral college in May 2012. The presence of the decimal number of votes counted for FO, UNSA and SUD-PTT at Gratuit is explained by the 
fact that these unions presented a single list at BRA. The votes were split according to a speciied key distribution decided by the organizations. 
On the branch, the results are only indicative because they do not cover all employees covered by the CCN.
Source: Calculated by the author based on the results compiled from each irm.
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had to be changed. The establishment of the CCN 
has reconigured the relationship of the distributors 
to their own work as well as their relation to trade 
unionism. Observing union conditions under the 
microscope of the formalization of labour relations 
allows us to consider the institutionalization of trade 
unionism in its contradictory dynamics. That labour 
relations are “concretized by the law” does not mean 
they are petriied by it. The law does not “cause” 
practice, it directs it as “one of the references on 
which to build interactions” (Lascoumes, Serverin, 
1995, p. 165). Legal representativity cannot there‑
fore be considered as an external variable which 
acts on the social representativity of trade unions. 
Rather, it is a resource that actors –trade unionists 
themselves, but also employers, government ofi‑
cials, etc.– mobilize through multiple channels.
Such a perspective allows us to study the impact 
of the reform of trade union representation in 
greater nuance, without yielding to a priori praises 
or denunciations. The mobilisation of the rules of 
representation in the two irms shows that the effects 
of the reform in terms of unionization proved to be 
ambivalent. For the effects of the new system of 
representation to de demonstrated, it had irst to be 
internalized in the speciic conditions of each irm’s 
coniguration. It thus seems that it does not neces‑
sarily furnish the unions with new resources. It may 
even involve having to do better with the same, if 
not fewer, resources. Far from being neutral, the 
procedure which derives union representativeness 
from employee elections establishes the union actor 
on the basis of the arena of social dialogue. In the 
case of direct distribution of printed matter, this 
generates new constraints which are different in 
each irm, in terms of the establishment of unions 
in the workplace. Thus the law acts as an indica‑
tor of the fragility of unions rather than as a lever 
to strengthen them. While failing to ensure this 
strengthening of trade unionism, does the reform 
of representativity lead to greater control by the 
employees over their representatives? We have seen 
that the reform has already begun to undermine the 
compromise which was at the basis of the consti‑
tution of the branch. But the destabilization of the 
branch organization is not subject to the employees’ 
arbitrage in support of organizations that are hostile 
to it. Nor is it subject to heightened control of ofi‑
cials by their constituents, or of more transparent 
collective discussions of issues in the industry: the 
new representation rules do not imply any opening 
up of issues for deliberation. They provide, however, 
an unexpected development related to new legal 
mechanics, as they connect the previously discon-
nected designative procedures.
The new rules of representativeness therefore 
respond to the “problem” of the institutionalization 
of unions even less, to the degree that this diagno‑
sis is poorly formulated. It seems more appropriate 
to consider the reform as a means of reconiguring 
union “institutionality.” This reformulation puts an 
end to the strictly negative vision underlying the 
theory of institutionalization (36) suggesting that 
there might be a living unionism, (37) free from any 
petriied form and outside of the institutions and 
the law. This is also the limit of a critical analysis 
based on the Marxism of Althusser, which relies on 
a base / superstructure dichotomy (Higelé, 2012). 
The issue is not so much trying to “oppose” or 
“limit” the institutionalization of trade unionism as 
to distinguish the different forms of “institutional‑
ity” running through it. This could, with Michels 
(1971), set the task of identifying those positions 
likely “to strengthen and stimulate the individu‑
al’s intellectual capacity for criticism and control” 
(p. 301), in order to strengthen what he called 
“democratic tendencies” against the “oligarchic 
tendencies.” Such a perspective would also operate 
the junction with the sociologically more robust 
deinitions of institutionalization, which do not 
reduce the concept to its legal dimension but rather 
consider all the norms guiding social practices.
(36) Another contribution to the critique of institutionaliza‑
tion, the ethnographic method, is proposed by Julian Mischi 
(2011) who shows that at the “base”, the relationship between 
employees and union representatives is less clear cut than it is a 
permanent trade‑off between distance and proximity.
(37) … or not: thus Rosanvallon (1998, p 247). He concluded 
his discussion by pointing out this contradiction: “Trade union‑
ism is torn between sociological legitimizing, now insuficient, 
and an impossible legitimization of a political nature.”
• 98 • Travail et Emploi, 2013 Special Edition
Bibliography
Adam G. (1983), Le pouvoir syndical, Paris, Dunod.
Andolfatto D., Labbé D. (2006), Histoire des syndicats 
(1906-2006), Paris, Seuil.
Andolfatto D., Labbé D. (2009), Toujours moins ! 
Déclin du syndicalisme à la française, Paris, Gallimard.
Bergounioux A. (1975), Force Ouvrière, Paris, Seuil.
Béroud S., Bouffartigue P. (dir.) (2009), Quand le 
travail se précarise, quelles résistances collectives?, 
Paris, La Dispute.
Bévort A., Jobert A. (2008), Sociologie du travail : les 
relations professionnelles, Paris, Armand Colin.
Borenfreund G., Souriac M.‑A. (dir.) (2008), Syndicats 
et droit du travail, Paris, Dalloz.
Bourdieu P. (1984), « La délégation et le fétichisme 
politique », Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 
n° 52‑53, pp. 49‑55.
Cartier M. (2003), Les facteurs et leurs tournées : un 
service public au quotidien, Paris, La Découverte.
Castel R. (1995), Les Métamorphoses de la question 
sociale : une chronique du salariat, Paris, Fayard.
Célérier S. (2012), « Le salariat dans la chair. 
Ambivalences du tâcheronnat dans les industries de 
viande de volaille », in Cingolani P. (dir.), Un travail sans 
limites? Subordination, tensions, résistances, Toulouse, 
Érès, pp. 81‑100.
Denis J.‑M. (2008), « Conventions collectives : quelle 
protection pour les salariés précaires? Le cas de la 
branche du nettoyage industriel », Travail et emploi, 
n° 116, pp. 45‑56.
Didry C. (2002), Naissance de la convention collective. 
Débats juridiques et luttes sociales en France au début 
du 20e siècle, Paris, EHESS.
Duclos L., Mériaux O., (2009), « Métamorphoses de 
l’institution corporative et crise des politiques de l’intérêt », 
in Duclos L., Groux G., Mériaux O. (dir.), Les Nouvelles 
dimensions du politique. Relations professionnelles et 
régulations sociales, Paris, LGDJ, pp. 33‑53.
Friot B. (2012), L’enjeu du salaire, Paris, La Dispute.
Grollier S. (2010), « Quelle syndicalisation des 
travailleurs de l’intérim?  », Savoir/Agir, n° 12, pp. 27‑33.
Guillaume C., Pochic S. (2009), « La professionnalisation 
de l’activité syndicale : talon d’Achille de la politique de 
syndicalisation à la CFDT?  », Politix, n° 85, pp. 31‑56.
Habermas J. (1993), L’espace public : archéologie de 
la publicité comme dimension constitutive de la société 
bourgeoise, Paris, Payot.
Henry E. (2005), « Militer pour le statu quo. Le Comité 
permanent amiante ou l’imposition réussie d’un 
consensus », Politix, n° 70, pp. 29‑50.
Higelé J.‑P. (2012), « Les formes de la délibération 
interprofessionnelle : le sens du dialogue », Sociétés 
contemporaines, n° 86, pp. 85‑111.
Howell C. (1998), “Virtual Trade Unionism in France: A 
Commentary on the Question of Unions, Public Opinion, 
and the State”, in Chapman H., Kesselman M., Schain M. 
(eds), A Century of Organized Labor in France: a Union 
Movement for the Twenty-First Century?, St. Martin’s 
Press, pp. 205‑212.
Howell C. (2009), “The Transformation of French 
Industrial Relations: Labor Representation and the State 
in a Post‑Dirigiste Era”, Politics & Society, vol. 37, n° 2, 
pp. 229‑256.
Lagroye J., Offerlé M. (dir.) (2010), Sociologie de 
l’institution, Paris, Belin.
lascoumes p., serverin É. (1995), « Le droit comme 
activité sociale : pour une approche wébérienne des 
activités juridiques », in Lascoumes P. (dir.), Actualité 
de Max Weber pour la sociologie du droit, Paris, LGDJ, 
pp. 155‑177.
Michels R. (1971), Les partis politiques : essai sur 
les tendances oligarchiques des démocraties, Paris, 
Flammarion (1re éd. 1914).
Mischi J. (2011), « Gérer la distance à la “base”. 
Les permanents CGT d’un atelier SNCF », Sociétés 
contemporaines, n° 84, pp. 53‑77.
Offe C. (1985), Disorganized capitalism. Contemporary 
transformations of work and politics, Cambridge, The 
MIT Press.
Offerlé M. (1998), Sociologie des groupes d’intérêt, 
Paris, Montchrestien.
Pélisse J. (2003), « Consciences du temps et consciences 
du droit chez des salariés à 35 heures », Droit et société, 
n° 53, pp. 163‑186.
Pélisse J. (2009), « Judiciarisation ou juridicisation? 
Usages et réappropriations du droit dans les conlits du 
travail », Politix, n° 86, pp. 73‑96.
Piotet F. (dir.) (2009), La CGT et la recomposition 
syndicale, Paris, Presses universitaires de France.
Rosanvallon P. (1998), La question syndicale, Paris, 
Hachette (1re éd. 1988).
Salais R. (2008), « Conventions de travail, mondes de 
production et institutions : un parcours de recherche », 
L’Homme et la société, n° 170‑171, pp. 151‑174.
Tallard M. (2004), Action publique et régulation de 
branche de la relation salariale, Paris, L’Harmattan.
Thomas A. (2011), « Universitaires engagés et nouveaux 
cadres syndicaux aux États‑Unis : une alliance pour 
faire face au déclin des syndicats?  », Genèses, n° 84, 
pp. 127‑142.
Tournay V. (2011), Sociologie des institutions, Paris, 
Presses universitaires de France, coll. « Que sais‑je?  ».
Vatin F., Bernard S. (dir.) (2007), Le salariat. Théorie, 
histoire et formes, Paris, La Dispute.
